Pitfalls in risk assessment Part 2

** Pitfalls in risk assessment Part 2 **

Here’s the final list of pitfalls in risk assessments in the paper.

·      Failure to identify all hazards associated with a particular activity – this suggests that while discrete hazards or energy sources may be identified, the particular pathways to failures may be missed

·      Failure to fully consider all possible outcomes – here’s it’s suggested to ensure that the time factor is incorporated, and “when considering events with more than one outcome, it is necessary to adopt cautious assumptions for each outcome”

·      Inappropriate use of data – for instance, historical data, failure rates etc. can shape what is found and perceived [** Consider the Fukushima accident and how historical data of tsunami wave height went back several hundred years…but in hindsight, wasn’t far enough back]

·      Inappropriate definition of a representative sample of events – here a representative sample of events is used instead of trying to consider all events. Naturally, care is needed here since this can curate the results

·      Inappropriate use of risk criteria – this includes tolerability of risk to stakeholders, fatality to society etc.

·      No consideration of ALARP or further measures that could be taken

·      Inappropriate use of cost benefit analysis

·      Using ‘Reverse ALARP’ arguments (i.e. using cost benefit analysis to attempt to argue that it is acceptable to reduce existing safety standards)

·      Not linking hazards with risk controls – this is a big one in my view. So many risk assessments, risk registers, SWMS/JSAs etc. are discrete shopping lists with little connection to actual work; they provide little context of how, where and when people will interact with hazardous conditions

·      Not doing anything with the results of the assessment – see also “supporting a decision already been made’. These two factors turn up a lot in major accident reports.

Further,

·      Jason Catterson in the first post added controls or protections listed in risk assessments that either places the onus on workers when they aren’t provided sufficient resources or time to implement, or that people know will never happen in practice; these could be called fantasy plans

·      Simon Cassin MA, BA (Hons) FRSPH, CMIOSH, MIIRSM, added that risk assessments may sometimes be “akin to letters to Santa. They are often a wish list rather than an actual evaluation of risk and realistic control methods”, and they may not consider the ethical impact of controls, nor the influence of human factors

What else is there?

Ref: Gadd, S. A., Keeley, D. M., & Balmforth, H. F. (2004). Pitfalls in risk assessment: examples from the UK. Safety Science, 42(9), 841-857.

Study link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2004.03.003     

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